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Abstract 
Software security is a major issue in software engineering, and the principles of software 
security are very clear to understand, but they are usually hard to implement. This is due 
to many security vulnerabilities that deter achieving a high level of security in software 
systems. 
In this thesis, I have collected information on relevant security vulnerabilities; I described 
and classified them into levels according to their risk degrees. To do that, I have built a 
model  based on different stages: (1) a learning stage to give the system engineer full and 
clear information about these security vulnerabilities, (2) a prediction stage that depends 
on the collected information to predict the possibility of each vulnerability and its effect 
(harm level) on the system, (3) in the scenario stage, the system engineer writes one or 
more scenarios to describe the circumstances (how and where) that would lead for each 
vulnerability and then suggests a preventive plan to avoid that vulnerability, (4) in the 
testing stage, the software is tested with all predictions on spot  by running a fuzzy test to 
be sure that the software is secure against known vulnerabilities, (5) and in the final 
stage, I write the implementation for the system auditor to check the overall security level 
of the software. 
We have suggested a plan to integrate this model into the four common phases of the 
software development lifecycle.   
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 ملخص الرسالة
تعد حماية البرامج من الثغرات من اهم الامور التي تناقش مرارا وتكرارا نتيجة ظهور أنواع متعددة 
برامج من الامور الصعبة في بعض الميادين لان بعض من الثغرات, ويعد العمل على حماية ال
البرامج تتعرض لثغرات نتيجة لغة البرمجة المستخدم والبيئة اللتي يستخدم بها البرنامج , اضافة الى 
الفهم الصحيح  للثغرات الامنية اللتي لا تطرح عادة ضمن مراحل حياة البرنامج على اختلاف 
 انواعها.
بجمع الثغرات الامنية وجميع المعلومات عنها من مصادر مختلفة , و قمت إبتدأت في هذه الرسالة 
بتصنيف هذه الثغرات بحسب اهميتها ونوع لغات البرمجة اللتي تستطيع هذه الثغرة اختراقها او 
 الانظمة المستضيفة للبرامج وكيفية الوقاية من الثغرات او تجنب حدوثها.
مت ببناء نموذج مبسط لتسهيل تجنب الثغرات الامنية ولتعليم وبعد دراسة مستفيضة للثغرات الامنية ق
المستخدم لهذه النموذج الثغرات الامنية التي قد تواجهه اثناء تطويره نظام معين ويتكون هذا النموذج 
 من المراحل التالية :
 التعلم : يتم من خلاله المرور على جميع الثغرات الامنية ودراستها جيدا - 1
جميع الثغرات الامنية المتوقع حدوثها بناًء على معطيات البرنامج المنوي  التوقع : يتم جمع - 2
 عمله
 كتابة طريقة تجنب حدوث الثغرة - 3
 تطبيق الطريقة المكتوبة في الفقرة السابقة - 4
 فحص البرنامج بناًء على التوقعات المحتملة  - 5
 كتابة تقرير بالثغرات اللتي تم التنبه لها  - 6
 iv
 
قترحت الية دمجه مع آليات تطوير البرامج المستخدمة من قبل وبعد ان قمت ببناء النموذج ا
المطورين , والية فحص البرنامج من ناحية امان البرنامج , والية قياس النموذج المقترح بناء على 
  المراحل اللتي يتم بها تطوير البرنامج.
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Structure of Thesis 
This research contains  six chapters: the first chapter presents an introduction on software 
security and gives a short problem description, the second chapter gives a background on 
software security and illustrates relevant definitions and concepts, the third chapter 
discusses related works and other modules on the security lifecycles, the forth chapter 
presents our model and how to test software security and test security models, and also 
contains data on  how to integrate our model with other software lifecycles models. The 
fifth chapter presents a real case on how to use this model with web applications, and the 
sixth chapter presents future work.  
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1. Introduction 
  
1.1 Purpose Statement 
 
This work aims at giving more focus on software security vulnerabilities and to enable 
software engineers and system developers to manage the issue of software security in all 
the phases of the software development lifecycle in a systematic way based on concrete 
knowledge. Towards that end, I have developed a new model that employs risk analysis 
techniques and rigorous testing rather than mere expectation and intuitive decisions. 
1.2 Thesis Target Audience 
 
Since software security is relatively a new field, it keeps attracting both researchers and 
developers, so this work can benefit system architects, system analysts, programmers, 
testers, and quality assurance personnel. 
This work is also suitable for academic institutions and software engineering educators, 
since it can help them understand the concepts of the software security and be able to 
predict security vulnerabilities. It also presents a simple and clear model that enables 
software engineers to solve security vulnerabilities during software design and 
development. 
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1.3 Objectives 
 
Towards the general aims outlined above, we try to achieve the following objectives: 
 Identify the security concepts 
 Identify the need for secure software 
 Identify the missing parts of related research work 
 Identify the types of security vulnerabilities  
 Introduce simple security vulnerabilities preventive model  
 Integrate this model into the four common software design models (Waterfall, 
Agile, Extreme Programming, and Iterative) 
 Present a testing measurement for software and security model. 
 Give examples of how to use this model with real example 
 
1.4 Problem Description 
Usually developers identify the security as an authentication and authorization issue, and 
they mix between security needs and system's requirements, and when I started to 
identify the security concepts for this thesis and its vulnerabilities, I found that I missed 
most of the part regarding security and its meaning. 
Software security problems appear in small software applications and even in enterprise 
applications. Similar mistakes are repeated by many developers. Most developers use one 
of the four common lifecycle models, and yet they have faced buffer overflows for 
example, and therefore many scenarios were put to solve this problem. 
3 
 
Many developers ignore security requirements since they are hard to describe and 
complex to implement, especially when the software becomes very large, and with 
distributed systems the problem becomes even more difficult. 
Another point to mention is that Security is hard to be measured after the software has 
been delivered as a closed box, and it will be difficult to test and modify the software by 
another person. 
By looking at OWASP “yearly top ten most critical Web application security risks” 
report [34], we found that 8 out of 10 are still in the most top 10 and the awareness of 
them is not increased. The graph below from this report shows the differences between 
2007 to 2010 top 10 most critical web application security risks 
OWASP Top 10 - 2007 (Previous Version) OWASP Top 10 - 2010 (Current Version) 
A2‐Injection Flaws  A1‐Injection
A1‐Cross Site Scripting (XSS)  A2‐Cross Site Scripting (XSS) 
A7‐Broken Authentication and Session Management A3‐Broken Authentication and Session Management
A4‐Insecure Direct Object Reference  A4‐Insecure Direct Object References 
A5‐Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)  A5‐Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) 
(was T10 2004 A10 ‐ Insecure Configuration 
Management) 
A6 Security Misconfiguration (NEW) 
A8‐Insecure Cryptographic Storage  A7‐Insecure Cryptographic Storage 
A10‐Failure to Restrict URL Access  A8‐Failure to Restrict URL Access 
A9‐Insecure Communications  A9‐Insufficient Transport Layer Protection 
(not in 2007 Top 10) A10‐Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards (NEW)
A3‐Malicious File Execution  <dropped from 2010 Top 10> 
A6‐Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling <dropped from 2010 Top 10> 
Table 1.1 Top 10 security risks 
1.5 The Need for Secure Software 
 
Usually system developers, designers, architectures and requirement analysts are unaware 
of the concepts of software security and give little or no consideration to security during 
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the development process. This has caused a large number of security problems within the 
software. 
CERT Coordination Centre [2] mentions that 90% of posted software security problems 
took place because of mistakes on the design phase of that software, bad coding style, or 
misunderstanding of the environment that the software will be deployed in. 
Security problems cause customers a huge loss of data, money and even the trust of the 
company for which they have developed the software. 
And from my real life experience, I found that any breach in software security causes the 
customers a big loss of money that affects the company’s reputation and usually other 
related customers as well. I experienced many cases that have occurred due to software 
security issues that caused a huge loss and would have been easily avoided if minor 
mistakes in deployment were discovered. 
1.6 Required Qualities of Security 
Secure software can be defined as the “software that is resistant to intentional attack as 
well as unintentional failures, defects and accidents” [10].  
From this definition we have to be aware that each software should be secure as a means 
of prevention from all available kinds of vulnerabilities. And to reach that goal we have 
to collect all available information about security vulnerabilities and put forward suitable 
plans so as to avoid them and make our software immune against attackers. We have to 
keep in mind that the attackers also collect this information and are usually aware of 
these vulnerabilities, and our mission is to protect our software against their knowledge. 
5 
 
Another quality that we have to take into consideration is the performance of our 
software, if security overheads will reduce software performance significantly, then we 
are going in the wrong direction! Security measures that are built on concrete knowledge 
and planning won’t affect performance significantly, but if we look at the security issue 
after the software has been completed and delivered, this will definitely reduce software 
performance significantly. 
Measurement of security is another key of quality, if we can explain the level that we 
reach in building this software this means that we admit that we provide all our best to 
protect our software and we don’t hide any information about the level of security we 
reach. 
Availability in system represents the service or functionality that is available when it is 
required, but as for security, it means that it is available every time not just when it is 
required, so we can measure the quality of security availability by the following rule: if 
security is missed once in the software, then it does not exist at all!   
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2. Background 
 
This chapter presents the concept of software security stated in the literature. This chapter 
will serve as a context building for upcoming discussion about improving security in the 
next chapters. 
2.1 Background: 
Software engineers start to think of the importance of the security issue when security 
vulnerabilities where found in their software. When customer’s private data is attacked 
and stolen by hackers, they blame software engineers for being less educated and cannot 
present secure software to their customers. So software engineers start to learn from their 
mistakes to avoid attacks and start writing scenarios on how to avoid security 
vulnerabilities and keep their customers satisfied with their work in order to keep giving 
life to the software development. 
The current development lifecycle views security as a useful case, procedures and testing 
but not as logical thinking to avoid vulnerabilities. Experts develop checklists, training 
programs, how to test manuals that handles few cases of security, but not whole phases 
on software lifecycle. 
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2.2 General Concepts of Software Security 
Definition of software security is all about Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability 
(CIA), in addition to, Authenticity, on-repudiation and Risk management and that stem 
from the software security definitions [5]: 
 Confidentiality is the property of preventing disclosure of information to 
unauthorized individuals or systems. 
 Integrity means that data cannot be modified without authorization, and maintain 
consistency of data. 
 Availability : mean that the information must be available when it is needed 
Security Vulnerabilities resources 
 Authenticity : mean to ensure that the data, transactions, communications or 
documents (electronic or physical) are genuine 
 Non-repudiation: implies one's intention to fulfill their obligations to a contract. 
It also implies that one party of a transaction cannot deny having received a 
transaction nor can the other party deny having sent a transaction. 
 Risk management: A comprehensive treatment of the topic of risk management 
is beyond the scope of this article. However, a useful definition of risk 
management will be provided as well as some basic terminology and a commonly 
used process for risk management. 
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2.3 Software Security Definitions 
Here we present some of the definitions of software security as they appear in the 
literature: 
  “Software Security is the ability of the software to resist, tolerate, and recover 
from events that intentionally threaten its dependability” [2] 
 “Software Security is about building secure software: designing software to be 
secure, making sure that software is secure, and educating software developers, 
architects, and users about how to build secure things” [3] 
 “The idea of engineering software that continues to function correctly under 
malicious attack” [5] 
 “The process of designing, building, and testing software for security” [8] 
 “Defends against software exploit by building software to be secure in the first 
place, mostly be getting the design right (which is hard) and avoiding common 
mistakes (which is easy)" [5] 
 “Software Security is system-wide issue that takes into account both security 
mechanisms (such as access control) and design for security (such as robust 
design that make software attacks difficult)”[5] 
According to all above definitions of software security we can conclude that they all 
focus on making the software more robust that can resist attacks, while keeping private 
data away from attackers. 
9 
 
Therefore we can define software security as follows: “The ability to analyze and measure 
the level of security that has been reached during the development lifecycle to avoid any 
security vulnerabilities and risks” 
2.4 Resources of Security Vulnerabilities 
In order to provide a new approach for integrating the security requirement in the 
software lifecycle – contrary to what other researchers have been doing in the past few 
decades, I have been working for two years trying to collect and identify all kinds of 
security vulnerabilities that affect software systems in general. As a result, I was able to 
identify 160 different security vulnerabilities in different types and flavors. Most of these 
can be considered as deadly (or catastrophic) vulnerabilities! I have included a list of all 
these vulnerabilities in the appendix. I summarized below the sources of these 
vulnerabilities:  
1- CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) [2]: is considered as an American 
governmental institute that is responsible for helping other governmental 
organizations on security vulnerabilities. 
2- OWASP (Open Web Application Security Project) [6]: Worldwide free and open 
community focused on improving the security of application software. I have 
obtained most of the security vulnerabilities information from this resource. 
3- 19 Deadly Sins of Software Security [36]: a book that contains information 
about 19 vulnerabilities. This book had helped me with its idea about discovering 
the vulnerabilities before software failures. 
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2.5 A Taxonomy of Software Security Terms  
Here I summarize most of the software security terms and vocabulary that are used in this 
thesis and in many software security books and the literature in general, and hereby I list 
the common ones and their meanings to make them clear and easier for the reader to 
understand. [1] 
Access Control List (ACL): A data structure or list that is maintained to track what 
users or groups have permissions to perform what actions.  This is a Windows term. 
Attack: A particular instance of an attempted introduction of one or more exploits to a 
system. 
Attacker: Someone who is trying to bypass the security of one or more pieces of the 
software in order to carry out some malicious agenda. 
Backdoor: A piece of malicious software that is installed and left running to provide a 
way for an attacker to regain system access at a later time. 
Cracker: Someone who “cracks” through software security, particularly licensing and 
copy protection. It is thought to have its roots in “safe cracker.” This term isn’t often 
used, in part because it is more narrowly focused and in part because it is just not as 
widely known and the differentiation between a hacker and a cracker is not clear yet. 
Cracking: The act of circumventing the copyright protection, licensing, or the 
registration functionality of the software. 
Daemon: A piece of software running in the background, usually as a process. 
Sometimes used interchangeably with “demon” in Unix® (The Open Group, San 
Francisco, California) term. 
11 
 
Denial of Service (DoS): Where legitimate users are prevented from accessing services 
or resources they would normally be able to access.  
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS): Where legitimate users are prevented from 
accessing services or resources by a coordinated attack from multiple sources. 
Escalation of Privilege: When attackers illegitimately gain more functionality or access 
than they are authorized to have. 
Ethical Hacker: One that performs penetration tests. Sometimes ethical hackers are also 
called “white hats.” 
Exploit: A code, a technique, or a program that takes advantage of a vulnerability to 
access an asset. 
Firewall: An application or hardware appliance designed to diminish the chances of an 
attack by limiting specific types of information that can pass into or out of a system or a 
network.   
Hacker: Someone who “hacks” programs, i.e., writes them in a particularly haphazard or 
unorganized manner. This wasn’t originally a term that was specific to attackers, but in 
the last few years it has become an often-used synonym for attackers, especially in the 
press. 
Hijacking: A situation when an attacker takes over control of one side of a two-sided 
conversation or connection. 
Hub: A networking device that repeats the network packets on the physical network 
layer among many devices.  
12 
 
Information Disclosure: A situation when an attacker is able to access information he or 
she shouldn’t be able to. 
Intrusion Detection System: An application that monitors a system or network and 
reports if it recognizes that the signs of an attack are present. 
Leets peek: The stereotypical sign of a script kiddie where text is written with numbers 
substituted for letters. The name comes from “elite.”  For example, “leet” is often written 
as “1337” or “l33t.” It’s also seen a lot in gaming communities. 
Media Access Control (MAC) Address: Also called the Physical Address, it is 
physically embedded in every network interface card (NIC) during the manufacturing 
process. MAC addresses are often treated as unique, although that is not actually 
guaranteed. 
OSI Network Model/OSI Seven Layer Model: The Open Systems Interconnection 
Reference Model. This is commonly used to explain at what point certain processes are 
taking place and how information travels. 
Personally Identifiable Information (PII): Information that is private to the user or 
machine. Disclosing PII is a violation of user privacy and can be a part of identity theft 
problems. 
Phishing: Social engineering on a large scale, usually to obtain things like login 
information, credit card numbers, etc.  
Protocol Stack: A system that implements protocol behavior based on a series of the OSI 
Network Model. 
13 
 
Reverse Engineering: The act of wholly or partially recreating the algorithms or designs 
used in software. This is usually done without source code  access. 
Rootkit or Root Kit: A set of tools and scripts that an attacker installs after successfully 
compromising a system. These are designed to automate additional tasks including 
installing additional programs like key loggers, remote administration tools, packet 
sniffers, backdoors, etc. Kernel Rootkits are rootkits that hide themselves within the 
Operating system’s kernel, making them a lot more difficult to detect. 
 Router: A hardware device that routes traffic between two networks. It can also disguise 
the traffic from the network behind it to make it appear as if all traffic comes from a 
single system. 
Script kiddie: The somewhat derogatory term for an attacker who primarily downloads 
and uses exploit code designed and written by others. “Script kiddie” tends to be used to 
signify a copy-cat type of attacker that is not particularly skilled or creative on his or her 
own. A script kiddie is also considered to be young, cocky, and brash.  
Social Engineering: The process of tricking or convincing a user into volunteering 
information the hacker can later use. This is often focused on things that are either 
finance related or material for identity theft. 
Spoofing: Impersonating someone or something else — such as another user or machine 
— in order to trick software security checks or users.  
Switch: A hardware device similar to a hub but which knows the hardware (MAC) 
addresses of each machine connected to it. This is so it can transmit packets only to the 
14 
 
individual machine it is addressed to. This has the positive side effect of reducing 
network traffic and noise. 
Threat: A possible path to illegitimate access of an asset.  
Trojan Horse: A piece of malicious software designed to deceive the victims by 
appearing to be a benign program that they may wish to use and thus are willing to 
download or install. 
Virus: A piece of malicious software that is capable of spreading itself, typically as part 
of a piece of software or a file that is shared between users. 
Vulnerability: A bug in the software that would allow an attacker to make use of a threat 
to illegitimately access an asset. All vulnerabilities are threats, but only unmitigated 
threats are vulnerabilities. 
Zero-Day Exploit: A vulnerability that is exploited immediately after its discovery, often 
before the software company or the security community is aware of the vulnerability. 
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3. Related Work 
 
3.1 Misuse Cases 
The concept was created in the end of the 1990s by Guttorm Sindre of the Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology and Andreas L. Opdahl of the University of 
Bergen, Norway [35], we found a complete framework; Strategic Modeling Technique, 
which covers in details both analysis and modeling in terms of security improvements. 
The framework introduces the definition of misuse cases of technique for many 
developers. This technique expects developers to be experts in security issues and have 
good experience of software development analysis and modeling in order to be used 
correctly. 
The following graph shows a scenario of misuse case and how the system analyst writes a 
scenario to counter attack for each one of the misuse 
cases.
16 
 
 
Figure 3.1 misuse cases 
3.2 Nonfunctional Requirements 
Another work comes from Chung et al [37], who classifies security requirements as 
non-functional requirements and present a general framework to deal with non-
functional requirements to express them explicitly in the software life cycle.  Chung 
believes that non-functional requirements are often subjective and relative. They 
introduced a set of sub-goals in order to satisfy a given security goal where the 
relationship between the sub-goals and the goal is either AND or OR 
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relationships.
 
Figure 3.2 Non Functional requirements 
 
3.3 Spiral Model   
This model was proposed by [37], and it is considered an extension of the iterative model 
assumes to have 4 phases, the first one is planning, the second is risk management, the 
third is development and testing and finally a plan for the next iteration. 
This model wants the developer to check in each phase the possible risk that could 
happen, without showing the system architecture the potential problem. 
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Figure 1.3 Spiral model 
 
 
3.4 Security Model for E-Education Process  
This research was presented in 2009 by [39], and provided a way of thinking of security 
vulnerabilities by using brainstorming to discuss system requirements, and try to figure 
out what could attack the system without providing previous knowledge about the 
security vulnerabilities. 
Another point concerning this model that it depends on tools that are not mentioned in the 
model context and here is that what is considered as missing point to the 
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developer.
 
Figure 3.2 Security Model for E-Education Process 
 
3.5 Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle 
Microsoft also provides its own security model to counter attack risk based on core 
training phase [28], even Microsoft has a long history in security vulnerabilities that 
attacks its products, bud this model is good for Microsoft developers. 
This phase focuses on Microsoft products only and discusses the vulnerabilities that may 
attack Microsoft products only, and that is ignoring large amount of security 
vulnerabilities for other technologies and products. 
Another point concerning  Microsoft model that does not exist on our model, is that we 
create counter attack scenario and test this scenario to investigate these scenarios, 
whether  it can prevent these vulnerabilities or not. 
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3.6 Other Research Behaviors:  
Software security researchers have written books on software security, solutions for many 
security problems, how to avoid them and how it could damage the software [8, 10]. 
Others wrote on how to test the software against security vulnerabilities, on risk 
management and how to keep the software in a stable status after being attacked [19, 32]. 
In my search for security concepts I found many security modules that can be followed to 
ensure security in software’s based on good knowledge for security in the developers 
minds. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Microsoft security development lifecycle 
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4. Our Model 
 
4.1 Our Contribution 
The main difference between my work and other works is that I am working first to 
collect all available information about security vulnerabilities and study them well, then 
start my model with a learning phase that provides the developer with the needed 
information about how to start thinking about security seriously and  how to be aware of 
all possible vulnerabilities then to share information on the last stage to the next 
responsible person. 
Another difference between my works and other software life cycle models is that I first  
focus on the security vulnerabilities and then I evolve my model into another model and I 
will explain later how to integrate my six layers into each model of the most known four 
models. 
Our Model 
In this chapter I will introduce my model depending on the works I have done in 
analyzing hundreds of security vulnerabilities supported from CERT. 
In this thesis we define six stages for the security lifecycle model: 
1- Learning stage : in this stage target audience will take the knowledge of the 
security Vulnerabilities that may occur in each phase of the software life cycle 
2- Predicting:  in this stage target audience will predict all possible vulnerabilities 
that may occur in each phase. 
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3- Write scenario: in this stage target audience will write the best scenario to 
complete this phase in order to completely pass all security vulnerabilities. 
4- Implementation: in this part target the audience will do the required work for 
this part of work such as analysis or implementation … etc. 
5- Apply all tests: in this stage target audience will apply all the related tests for his 
stage as I will explain how to get the test from the sheet that contains all security 
vulnerabilities. 
6- Documentations:  writing notes to next stage implementer is very meaningful for 
security life cycle since most of vulnerabilities occur due to miss information 
between people in each stage. 
 
And in the rest part of this chapter I will write details for each phase of security life 
cycle with an example for each. 
 
Figure 4.1 Model basic graph 
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4.1.1 Learning Stage: 
In this stage we will take the knowledge and learn about the security vulnerabilities that 
may occur in the stage of implementation, this knowledge comes from a complete list of 
all security vulnerabilities provided by CERT. 
Taking knowledge from the list will make it easy to target audience since this sheet 
provides the list with description of each problem and in which stage each vulnerability 
may occur, so it needs just to look at your required part and take knowledge of its 
information and will study the provided case. 
The information listed in the sheet required only one time and then the knowledge is 
provided to each time it’s needed. 
And if the sheet is updated, it will be easy to target audience to learn the new 
vulnerability and to take it into consideration since most of the vulnerabilities are 
dependent on the environments that are used. 
4.1.2 Prediction Stage 
After target audience take the knowledge of all above vulnerabilities it will be easy to 
predict what could happened during the work depending on his own style. 
Many system architects don’t fall in any of those vulnerabilities without knowing the risk 
that may occur if they fail in one of them. 
Predicting stage can be included into two stages in the software life cycle:  the stage of 
writing the system requirements and analysis requirements. So the target audience will 
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take in consideration all the system requirements and analysis in order to predict all the 
possible failure. 
4.1.3 Writing Scenario 
Writing scenario is the core stage of the security life cycle , and this means the how much 
we learn from the learning stage ,so the target audience will do the best to pass through 
all points in the list above and write complete system requirements and security 
requirements to avoid any chance of failure. And if we review the list in the prediction 
stage we will find that all of them are of type of warning and all are easy to take in 
consideration. Then the target audience will write system analysis and showing  more 
details in writing each point to clarify to the system implementer  all the warning as 
points so as to  consider them as functional requirements. 
Here, the meaning of writing scenario is to write all possible user workflow control and 
to insure that all vulnerabilities are prevented and none of them could occur to the system 
target that audience working on.  
Scenario writer must write security vulnerabilities according to their reference and level, 
the reference means where this vulnerability comes from and the level estimates the level 
of damage that may occur if this security vulnerability is left without handling. 
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4.1.3.1 Security Vulnerabilities and References: 
a. Technology security vulnerabilities 
b. Implementation security vulnerabilities 
c. Environment security vulnerabilities 
d. User security vulnerabilities 
e. Third party system security vulnerabilities 
f. Integration security vulnerabilities 
g. Business rules security vulnerabilities  
h. Anonymous user vulnerabilities 
 
4.1.3.2 Security Vulnerability Level: 
I choose the name of the vulnerability level based on old phonetic alphabets just because 
old communication via radio signal used this name to give the listener the value of thing 
they agree on and so I choose the developer that agrees on such name to be common to 
the level of vulnerability 
1- Delta (Severe)  :this is  the most dangerous level and this means it will be 
hard to restore system or system data after security vulnerabilities are  
attacked 
2- Charlie (High) : this means that danger could cause loss the data, or either 
copy the data where it’s considered as   damage the customer business 
3- Bravo (Elevated) : high dangerous, could cause stealing the  customer 
business and make the customer lose money after this vulnerability is being  
attacked 
4- Alpha (Controlled ) : this level means that if these vulnerabilities attacke, 
system or data will still be safe but system behavior will not work as expected 
26 
 
5- Echo (system workflow hit): this is the least level in this scale and it means 
that everything will be kept as expected and there will be no loss of data or 
system, and the system behavior will be kept as expected ,but strange behavior 
may occurs in third party software or hosting environment. 
And from the above specifications scenario writer can use the following template in order 
to fill the scenario: 
#  Name  Description  Scenario steps  Reference  Level 
Table4.1:Writing the scenario 
 
This stage of the security life cycle for the first time seems very hard to the target 
audience since he has to think badly, and try to write all bad scenario that may affect the 
security of the system. Most system hacker use the knowledge in order to damage any 
system, they have to get a clear guess of how the system is built so as to find the system 
security vulnerabilities. 
There are a lot of books that describe how to attack systems, all of them depend on 
knowing the system behavior and if they don’t know how the system is built, they guess 
and build in their mind a similar system so they can guess the mistakes that the system 
developers failed to prevent. 
Any other suggested form or sheet is not bad but I just try to provide applicable form to 
the scenario writer and he can write his scenario using  his own words , and this means 
that the writing phase fully describes the level or education that the writer reach, his 
words give us clear vision of what he means, and for another purpose since some cases 
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are different from each other, some of them can be written as notes ,others require full 
description and graph to be  illustrated  like Buffer Overflow and Buffer underwrite. 
 
4.1.4 Implementation 
Implementation here means that implementing security requirements are not the software 
implementation, and the system developer who works to implement this requirements has 
to take care of the written scenario and refer to the predicting scenario and get 
vulnerabilities information from the vulnerabilities sheet. 
The main goal of this model is to make it easy for the implementer to apply all security 
requirements; this goal requires us to provide system developer with all required 
information, scenarios, and predicting all information for any vulnerability. 
Implementation steps: 
 Review all the available vulnerabilities and review that developer is  aware of 
each one 
 Review all predicting vulnerabilities  
 Review and Pass through each vulnerabilities scenario 
 Start to implements with the knowledge of the above steps 
 
And when developer starts the implementation phase and code writing he will be more 
aware of the security vulnerabilities after being predicted and written as scenario from 
more than one person or more than one step. 
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4.1.5 Apply All Tests 
Software security testing in other models require the tester to have more experience, more 
work to do, and to expect the unexpected vulnerabilities. While searching for testing 
security in software, many books described the security tester as a long experienced and 
very good knowledgeable person, who can discover security vulnerabilities that system 
developer is now aware of, but in this model, security tester has to follow the sheet 
provided by another phase to generate a list of tests that need to be done, and here the 
main advantage of my model is to make it straight forward for each phase in the model 
After implementation we have to test whether the implementation blocks any security 
vulnerabilities or not, this test must be classified and sorted out so as not to ignore any 
vulnerability. 
Test phase must be done by a person who must have the knowledge and the ability to 
rearrange the entire tests scenario to apply them with the order that does not ignore any 
vulnerability. 
The meaning of ignoring vulnerabilities is that some vulnerability occurs as a result of 
vulnerabilities, such as “Using freed memory” that can cause to “Unintentional pointer 
scaling”, and serious tester must be aware of the meaning of vulnerabilities that make 
vulnerabilities. 
And security test must not be ambiguous that’s to say it must be  different from software 
test and each one has its own goals and its reference to depends on, even if the same 
person does both tests he  should separate from the system functional tests. 
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4.1.5.1 Security Testing Requirements 
1- Technology knowledge : tester must have a good experience in the technology 
used in this system, this is  because new technologies are  different from each 
other and each one  has framework and vulnerabilities that can’t be applied  to  
other technologies 
2- Aware of Code Complexity: The more complex the code, the more likely it is to 
have security vulnerabilities as well. 
3- Code Coverage: this means that tester has to pass over all the code that the 
software has, the percentage of code coverage is an important issue to determine 
the coverage of test and the security of the software. 
4- Test environment :it is similar or close to the production environment 
5- Describe your attacker: tester must have a good idea of just who these attackers 
are and what their skills and motivations are. 
6- Define attacker’s goals: this means that any attackers have a goal to reach in order 
to hack your software, and the testers have to identify their goals to prevent them 
from attacking your software. 
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4.1.5.2 Testing Plan 
As mentioned before, the security testing in this model is completely straightforward and 
needs the test just to implement using the available test that comes from our research 
about all security vulnerabilities, predicting phase and written scenario and collecting  all 
these data and exposing them to testing matrix. 
Testing matrix is a matrix that combines between the predicting phase of the written 
scenario and surely the implementation itself. 
So all tests must be available to be done, the tester has to order test and make sure that the 
order is meaningful and not to ignore any test because of the order. 
 
4.1.5.3 Time Plane for the Test 
Tester must put test plan for the time of the tests so as to determine the time spent for 
executing each test in order not to have a conflict between the two tests and not waste  the 
testing time. 
Tester has to determine the required time to investigate each vulnerabilities, and since 
this requires the tester to be aware of the vulnerability itself and then to pass through the 
software code so as to check whether this vulnerability is handled with the code written 
or not. 
The time needed for running  all tests can be modify according to the test results, if tests 
start to succeed one after another then there is no need to stick completely to the time 
plan and test can go faster. 
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4.1.5.4 Fuzz Testing (Fuzzing) 
The term Fuzz originated from Prof. Barton Miller's student assignment at the University 
of Wisconsin in the Fall of 1988, titled "Operating System Utility Program Reliability - 
The Fuzz Generator".[40] In quality assurance and testing, the same approach (using 
unexpected data or syntax) has been called robustness testing, syntax testing or negative 
testing. Even white-noise testing can be thought of as fuzzing.   
Fuzz testing is mostly used to test the stability of the software since if you can post the 
software entry points data larger than what he expects, that may cause the software to 
hang-up and may cause to stop the software from being served to the customer, and this 
is considered as security vulnerability since it’s used to prevent the  user from accessing 
the service. 
And to insure that tester has done the fuzz testing in the testing phase, every security 
vulnerabilities that may occurs as result of fuzz testing must be  included in the learning 
phase and during learning phase and expectation phase they can see that it’s available to 
be taken into consideration. 
4.1.5.5 Result of the Tests 
Result of the test should be clear with scenario of the fail, this means that the tester has to 
complete the scenario of the test, and write the scenario to the implementer showing how 
to do each test. 
Result of the test also should have the reference of the test, this means that the tester must 
get to know where this test is from, and here in this model; is it from the expected 
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vulnerabilities or from the learning stage and the expectation stage, and here the tester 
should be aware of the missing test from the expectation stage. 
Table 4.2 describes show a form of the table result sheet. 
 
Test order  Test 
name 
Test 
scenario 
Test 
reference 
Test time  Test result  Test note
             
Table 4.2 : Result of the tests 
 
4.1.6 Documentations 
Writing notes in this security model gives a security auditor or any security test to know 
the ability of the level of the security in this software and how to add new vulnerability 
blocker to the software. 
Writing notes is not the result of the security test; it is the description of what that 
software can apply of rules to prevent any security vulnerability that may attack the 
software. 
4.1.6.1 Documentations Elements  
Security notes contains the following elements 
1- System description 
2- Description of used technology 
3- Environment developed on. 
4- Environment deploy on. 
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5- Security vulnerability expected 
6- Expected Security vulnerability blocker 
7- Implementer notes on vulnerabilities 
8- Tester notes  
 
System Description 
This section contains a description of the system and its aim and this must contain 
information on the analysis document that builds the system 
Description of Used Technology 
Systems may contain several technologies in the same project and the combination 
between technologies to build this system, since combining or connecting technologies 
presents security vulnerabilities. 
Environment Developed On 
Describing the development environment is a key issue to describe the changes in the 
development environment and deployment environment to keep the auditor aware of the 
vulnerabilities that may not checked during development. 
Environment Deploy On. 
To describe the target environment that the system will be deployed on, and to investigate 
the changes between development environment and deployment environment. 
Security Vulnerability Expected 
List of all expected vulnerabilities in the expectation stage to show the level of 
expectation reached during development 
Expected Security Vulnerability Blocker 
Describe the work done to prevent security vulnerabilities from attacking  our software 
ability to improve blocker 
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Implementer Notes on Vulnerabilities 
Notes of the system developer and system implementer about the security vulnerabilities 
that have been expected. 
Tester Notes 
Notes of the tester and notes about the result of security test, and this is to show to the 
auditor the level of acceptance that the tester reached. 
 
4.1.7 Review of Our Model 
During this chapter we passed through my model and showed the stage that I assumed 
will prevent security vulnerability based on knowledge before implementation. 
 Learning is the phase where system engineer explores new information about 
security vulnerabilities. 
 Prediction is the phase where system engineer expects security vulnerabilities 
based on the information. 
 Writing scenario is the stage where system engineer describes how many security 
vulnerabilities occur. 
 Implementation phase shows where prevention and blocking of the security 
vulnerabilities are done. 
 Applying all test phase makes test to all security vulnerabilities and ensures that 
the system is secure for all expected vulnerabilities. 
 Writing the note phase is the final stage and here we write to the IT auditor what 
we do on each environments and how we do it. 
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The main goal of this model is to facilitate the process of the security testing of software 
since most system engineer does not have good knowledge of security vulnerabilities and 
its level of danger to the system they develop and what the meaning of hacking system is. 
Most people think that the hacker is a genius one who can discover attack, stall and 
destroy systems based on his intelligence and here we clear that all security 
vulnerabilities occur due to lake of knowledge and attacker got that knowledge. 
 
4.2 Security Measurements 
In this section we will discuss security measurement, how to measure my model 
according to common security measurement and how to measure any security software 
built on this model. 
4.2.1 Software Security Measurable Entities 
Before starting measure my model, we must agree on the entity to measure security at 
any software and then put the entity to measure my security model. 
1‐ Provided Level Of Protection: this entity get its information from the result test and 
from the notes written on the software. 
2‐ Applying Customer Internal Policy: if the security of the software violates the customer 
policy this means that this software is not fit  for the requirements. 
3‐ System Performance: the affected performance due to security of this software. 
4‐ Cost: the extra money needed to secure this software against software budget. 
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5‐ Time‐Orientation: needed time to secure the system: the extra time needed to secure 
software against the time needed to develop the software. 
6‐ Software Modification: this issue reflects the level of security when modification is 
applied on the software. 
7‐ Integration with Other System: this issue reflects the change on level of security due to 
integration of this software with other software’s. 
 
4.2.2 Security Model Measurable Entities  
Measuring the model is different from measuring software, here we are talking about 
model and we have to measure it against other models, and rank it with models entities, 
and for that I listed my own entities that reflect the goals of this models  
1- Security Level Reached: the security level reached in this model is high since I 
collect all kinds of security vulnerabilities and classified them into categories and 
provided them to the developer to help in protecting software. 
2- Usability of This Model : as you can see in the next chapter I merged this model 
into the four common life cycle and made it usable and meaningful for the 
developer 
3- Cost Saving:  saving money that may be spent on security of  the software after 
being  deployed is greater rather than spending  it during development. 
4- Time Saving: secure software against all kinds of vulnerabilities is saving time in 
consideration to the time needed if software is attacked after being deployed  where 
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it’s possible to lose data and customers privacy. and after using this model for the 
first time, developer learning  time is reduced and after a while it goes to zero time. 
5- Portability: this model is portable for all kind of technologies and all kinds of 
programming language since it collects information for all kinds of security 
vulnerabilities. 
6- Documentation :  in this model each phase is concluded with documentation that 
help other phase until it  reaches the last phase where documentation and notes deal 
with IT auditor level and represent the level of security that this software reaches. 
 
4.3 Integrating with Common Software Lifecycle Models 
In this chapter I will inject the security model in the four software lifecycle that are 
mostly used and I will show how to include it in any software lifecycle 
4.3.1 Waterfall Lifecycle 
The waterfall model is a sequential software development process, in which progress is 
seen as flowing steadily downwards (like a waterfall) through the phases of Conception, 
Initiation, Analysis, Design, Construction, Testing and Maintenance. 
Waterfall life cycle is the most common used way of software engineering process and it 
is considered the simplest one in any other software lifecycles.  
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And figure 4.2 shows the steps those bases during this lifecycles 
 
Figure 4.2 waterfall lifecycle 
 
 
And to inject my model into this lifecycle I do the following: 
1- Learning and predicting stages added to the requirements phase 
2- Writing scenario added to the design stage 
3- Implementation phase added to implementation phase 
4- Applying all test added to the verification phase 
5- Writing  notes added after the software is launched 
 
And graph 4.3 shows the new design of the waterfall that contains my module and each 
step inside it, and here I created a new step for software launch where writing notes is 
embedded in. 
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Figure 4.3 Waterfall with security model 
 
 
 
4.3.2 Agile Software Development 
Agile software development refers to a group of software development methodologies 
based on iterative development, where requirements and solutions evolve through 
collaboration between self-organizing cross-functional teams. 
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Figure 4.4 Agile development lifecycle 
  
Agile processes use feedback, rather than planning so this can make a lot of security 
vulnerabilities and resolve them more quickly than waterfall model. And to add my 
model to this iterative model I did the following: 
1- Learning phase before the iteration start. 
2- Prediction and in the requirements and feedback. 
3- Write scenario in the analysis stage. 
4- Implementation in the coding stage 
5- Apply all tests in the Testing stage. 
6- Write notes in the delivers increment stage. 
And graph 4.5 shows how the security models are embedded into the agile software 
lifecycle 
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Figure 4 Agile with security model 
 
 
4.3.3 Iterative and Incremental Development 
Iterative and Incremental development is a cyclic software development process 
developed in response to the weaknesses of the waterfall model. It starts with an initial 
planning and ends with deployment with the cyclic interaction in between. 
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Figure 5 Iterative and Incremental Development 
 
I found that this model is acceptable to my model more easily in its stage since it does 
evaluation phase then goes to another level and here they can apply all test and write 
notes to the next iteration.  
And I add my model as the following 
1- Learning stage comes with the initial planning. 
2- Prediction and write scenario in the analysis & design stage. 
3- Implementation phase in the implementation phase. 
4- Apply all tests in the testing phase. 
5- Write notes in the evaluation phase. 
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And graph 4.7 shows how the security models is embedded into the iterative and 
incremental 
model  
Figure 4.7 Iterative and Incremental Development with security model 
 
 
4.3.4 XP: Extreme Programming 
Extreme Programming (XP) is a software development methodology which is intended to 
improve software quality and responsiveness to changing customer requirements. As a 
type of agile software development, it advocates frequent "releases" in short development 
cycles (time boxing), which is intended to improve productivity and introduce 
checkpoints where new customer requirements can be adopted. 
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Figure 4.8 XP: Extreme Programming 
 
Extreme programming is the best iterative process to work on continuous work that keeps 
and adds new feature and new requirements. 
And to add my model into the XP model I do the following: 
1- Learning stage comes before the iteration start 
2- Prediction in the break down stories to tasks stage 
3- Write scenario in the plan release 
4- Implementation in the development stage 
5- Apply all test comes before release software 
6- Write notes comes in the evaluate system. 
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And graph 4.9 shows the XP model with security model embedded into it where you will 
find that learning stage is before the iterative start 
 
Figure 4.9 XP: Extreme Programming with security model 
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5. Experiment 
 
Here in this chapter we will pass through real life example, and try to implement our 
security model, and explain in some points how to use this model, how to write scenarios 
and how to test our products. 
We take an example of building Web application using ASP.net with SQL server; this 
application is social community web application that enables visitors to contact each 
other.  
And here are some requirements of this application: 
1- Users will have to register in order to create an account  
2- After registration, activation of the email will be sent to users account 
3- User will have to log in after they creating the  account 
4- Users can upload their photos, videos to the site 
5- User can comment on their photos, videos or their friends. 
6- Users can add other users as friends and also they can delete friends 
If we look at these customer requirements we will finds that they are simple and common 
in web application, and here we will try to break security threat into expected 
vulnerabilities. 
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5.1 Learning Stage: 
Here after reviewing and learning from the vulnerabilities sheet, we must take knowledge 
of the below related vulnerabilities, since they all related to the following area: 
1- Web Application 
2- ASP.net technologies 
3- SQL server 
4- Windows environment 
5- Amateur users 
6- Anonymous users 
And we found that the below list is joining these areas:  
 Addition of data-structure sentinel 
 Allowing password aging 
 ASP.NET Misconfigurations 
 Business logic vulnerability 
 Catch NullPointerException 
 Comparing classes by name 
 Cross Site Scripting Flaw 
 Deserialization of untrusted data 
 Empty Catch Block 
 Empty String Password 
 Failure of true random number generator 
 Failure to add integrity check value 
 Failure to drop privileges when reasonable 
 Failure to encrypt data 
 Failure to protect stored data from modification 
 Failure to provide confidentiality for stored data 
 Failure to validate host-specific certificate data 
 Format String 
 Hard-Coded Password 
 Ignored function return value 
 Injection problem 
 Insecure Randomness 
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 Insecure Third Party Domain Access 
 Insufficient Session-ID Length 
 Log Forging 
 Missing XML Validation 
 Not allowing password aging 
 Often Misused: Authentication 
 Often Misused: Privilege Management 
 Often Misused: String Management 
 Open redirect 
 Password Management: Weak Cryptography 
 Password Plaintext Storage 
 Privacy Violation 
 Session Fixation 
 Storing passwords in a recoverable format 
 String Termination Error 
 Truncation error 
 Trust of system event data 
 Trusting self-reported DNS name 
 Trusting self-reported IP address 
 Uncaught exception 
 Unreleased Resource 
 Unrestricted File Upload 
 Using password systems 
 Write-what-where condition 
 
The list seems to be very long and it requires long time to be learned and that’s the point 
we need, the target audience needs to know all the potential vulnerabilities before starting 
to work on the project, and this knowledge is not needed to be transferred every  time the 
target audience will develop a new web application, and this will reflect the rest parts in 
the application so it becomes easier and more trusted every  time it’s checked. 
And if we look at  the list one more time we see that it is divided into all phases in the 
software life cycle, and let’s say to the system analyst that there are 12 points, for 
developer there are 19 points, for deployed about 7 points … etc. 
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5.2 Predicting Stage  
As a system analysis and system requirements collector, I will write the following 
predictions according to the requirements and to the above list: 
1- Allowing password aging: since visitor will be able to log  in using their own 
credentials. 
2- Business logic: this is ways of using the legitimate processing flow of an 
application in a way that results in a negative consequence to the organization. 
3- Empty String Password: this validation should be written in the system analysis 
documents. 
4- Failure to add integrity check value: this validation should be written in the 
system analysis documents. 
5- Failure to drop privileges when reasonable: this validation should be written in the 
system analysis documents. 
6- Failure to provide confidentiality for stored data: this validation should be written 
in the system analysis documents. 
7- Failure to validate host-specific certificate data: this validation should be written 
in the system analysis documents. 
8- Hard-Coded Password: this validation should be written in the system analysis 
documents. 
9- Insecure Third Party Domain Access: this validation should be written in the 
system analysis documents. 
10- Log Forging: this validation should be written in the system analysis documents. 
11- Often Misused: Authentication: this validation should be written in the system 
analysis documents. 
12- Often Misused: Privilege Management: this validation should be written in the 
system analysis documents. 
13- Password Management: Weak Cryptography: this validation should be written in 
the system analysis documents. 
14- Password Plaintext Storage: this validation should be written in the system 
analysis documents. 
15- Privacy Violation: this validation should be written in the system analysis 
documents. 
16- Trusting self-reported DNS name: this validation should be written in the system 
analysis documents. 
 
The above 16 points are taken from the 45 points in the learning stage where I predict 
these fail to occur so I write my system analysis and collect system requirements and take 
them all into consideration. 
50 
 
 
5.3 Write Scenario  
Let’s take one example of security scenario on our web application and show how this   
list help system developer to check their software against security falls. 
# Name Description Scenario steps Reference Level 
1 SQL 
Injection 
User attempt to log in 
using other user accounts 
depends on miss apply to 
SQL query sent from 
web application 
Try to offer a 
complete string 
in the password 
field to be 
concatenating 
with the passed 
query 
implementation Bravo  
2  …  …  …  ..  … 
Table 5.1: Case study scenario 
 
And after writing all scenarios this will be considered as part of the tests in the test phase,  
5.4 Implementation 
Here in this part we will skip it in order to avoid writing application in our thesis, but we 
just give knowledge of each risk. 
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5.5 Apply All Tests 
After finishing implementation, we have to build a test sheet that contains all expected 
vulnerabilities and their counter attack scenario. 
 
Test order  Test 
name 
Test scenario Test 
reference 
Test 
time  
Test result Test note
1  SQL  
injection 
Try to pass true 
condition value 
to the login page 
Technologies 
(ASP.net) 
00:00  Pass  Ok 
2  Weak 
password  
Try to update 
user password 
with the 
password 
(123456) 
Implementatio
n 
00:12  System 
request to 
have solid 
password 
‐ 
3  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
Table 2.2 Apply all Tests 
 
5.6 Documentation  
Documentation here will include the following information as an example of the required 
entity for this case study 
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1- System description:  Web application using ASP.net with SQL server, this 
application is social community web application that enables visitor to contact 
with other. 
2- Description of used technology :  
a. ASP.net as presentation layer,  
b. SQL server as data layer,  
c. .net classes as business logic layer 
3- Environment developed on:  
a. windows XP service pack 3 as hosted developed environment 
b. visual studio 2008 as development IDE 
c. SQL server 2005 express edition as database 
d. IIS 6  
4- Environment deploy on: 
a. Windows server 2008 
b. IIS 7 
c. SQL server 2008 
d. .net framework 2,3,3.5,4 all enabled 
5- Security vulnerability expected : all the 16 points in the prediction layer 
6- Expected Security vulnerability blocker : all the points in the write scenario tables 
7- Implementer notes on vulnerabilities : these points come with the implementation 
codes 
8- Tester notes: the result table of applying all test phase. 
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6. Conclusion and Future Work 
6.1 Conclusion 
Based on my previous experience in software development, I found that most of the 
software lifecycle models and phases lack the necessary mechanisms for software 
security, and mainly focuses on the mechanisms to distribute authentication and 
authorization information which is far away from the real or genuine meaning of security. 
In this work I have collected many security vulnerabilities that I found in trusted 
resources, illustrated and classified them in a clear way to create a model that can be used 
by software engineers and researchers to predict and resolve security issues during the 
software development lifecycle.  
The proposed model is applied in 6 stages and starts with a learning stage; this division 
provides greater understanding of potential security vulnerabilities in all lifecycle stages 
and up to the level of authentication phase (IT auditors). We have followed a 
comprehensive approach to better serve the developer, by showing how to integrate the 
proposed model into the four common software lifecycles models by including an 
appropriate security phase in each model.   
The first three stages of the model (Learning, Prediction, and Writing Scenarios) can be 
applies in the earlier stages of the software lifecycle such as requirements collection, 
analysis, and design stages. This distribution gives the developer the chance to learn 
about security vulnerabilities early in the lifecycle and allows him to take the required 
measurements to avoid any security risks. 
54 
 
The last three stages of the model (Implementation, Applying all tests, and 
Documentation), represent the natural place where the security scenarios are applied, and 
then test the required functionality of this software and the basic authentication and 
authorization for that software. Adding security test to the testing phase will enrich the 
testing phase and help testers in formatting their tests according to the provided forms. 
Documentation is also a very important phase in delivering the application and collecting 
information about what security auditor ask for and how to help security auditors do their 
testing. 
We have included a simple application scenario that passes through each stage, and show 
how the model can applied in a real life application. The example shows what 
vulnerabilities we need to take care of, and how to write a scenario to counter attack each 
one of them, and last it shows how to document our work for delivery to the end user. 
And after this example we arrive to the following conclusions: 
1- Software security vulnerabilities occur due to lack of information about them. 
2- Software engineering lifecycles should include security risk handling mechanisms 
in all phases not only as a risk analysis phase. 
3- Work on security vulnerabilities based on concrete and complete knowledge 
minimizes the required time to counter attack and avoid serious damage scenarios. 
4- Risk management for software security should be the last choice to secure our 
software systems—planning for security should start at the first stage of 
information collection. 
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5- Writing scenarios on counter attacks can be reused for other similar software 
pieces and this minimizes time. 
6- Integrating this model into software lifecycle models is easy and manageable and 
does not require significant overhead.   
7- The documentation to describe software security handling process is an important 
and integral part in delivering the software and testing it. 
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6.2 Future Works 
Based on the proposed model, we can facilitate a better understanding and awareness 
about the many risks and vulnerabilities that can appear in software security. We hope 
that this model will provide better protection to software programs and their state of 
continuity as a whole. 
To move forward in this area of research, I will try to achieve an intelligent working 
system based on the analysis data to offer a process-centric system for detecting all 
possible security vulnerabilities and providing context-sensitive mechanisms to avoid 
them. This can be achieved by doing a thorough examination of each security 
vulnerability in advance and according to the program requirements and then submitting 
a report on each vulnerability.  
Most of security vulnerabilities come from the state of ignorance of relevant security 
principles, the lack of knowledge on this area, and the lack of interest on this issue. In 
addition, people tend to believe that the running environment or the firewall can secure 
their systems from attackers, ignoring the fact that these environments and firewalls 
themselves face a lot of security vulnerabilities. 
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6.3 Collected Vulnerabilities 
Here in this section we provide the collected vulnerabilities with their description, 
software stage and vulnerabilities emergency level for each one of them. 
 
Vulnerabilities description current software 
stage 
Level 
Access control 
enforced by 
presentation layer 
Enforcing access control in the presentation layer 
means that the developer does not show buttons and 
links for functions and assets that are not authorized 
for the user. An attacker, however, is not 
constrained by the buttons nd links presented, and 
can forge requests for those functions and assets. 
Forced browsing is one attack that targets this type 
of vulnerability. 
Implementation Bravo  
Addition of data-
structure sentinel 
The accidental addition of a data-structure sentinel 
can cause serious programming logic problems. 
Design Alpha  
Allowing 
password aging 
Allowing password aging to occur unchecked can 
result in the possibility of diminished password 
integrity. 
Implementation Echo  
ASP.NET 
Misconfigurations 
Debugging messages help attackers learn about the 
system and plan a form of attack 
Design Alpha  
Assigning instead 
of comparing 
In many languages, the compare statement is very 
close in appearance to the assignment statement 
and are often confused 
Implementation Alpha  
Authentication 
Bypass via 
Assumed-
Immutable Data 
Assumed-immutable authentication data can be 
modified by attackers to bypass the authentication. 
Most of the time, this vulnerability results from 
inappropriate session management, i.e., important 
data that is used for authentication decisions is sent 
to the client side and subject to user modification. 
This kind of data should be stored in the server-side 
session as much as possible. 
Implementation Alpha  
Buffer Overflow Buffer overflow is probably the best known form of 
software security vulnerability. Most software 
developers know what a buffer overflow 
vulnerability is, but buffer overflow attacks against 
both legacy and newly-developed applications are 
still quite common. Part of the problem is due to 
the wide variety of ways buffer overflows can 
occur, and part is due to the error-prone techniques 
often used to prevent them. 
Implementation Bravo  
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Buffer underwrite A buffer underwrite condition occurs when a buffer 
is indexed with a negative number, or pointer 
arithmetic with a negative value results in a 
position before the beginning of the valid memory 
location. 
Implementation Alpha  
Business logic 
vulnerability 
Most security problems are weaknesses in an 
application that result from a broken or missing 
security control (authentication, access control, 
input validation, etc...). By contrast, business logic 
vulnerabilities are ways of using the legitimate 
processing flow of an application in a way that 
results in a negative consequence to the 
organization. 
Design Bravo  
Capture-replay A capture-relay protocol flaw exists when it is 
possible for a malicious user to sniff network traffic 
and replay it to the server in question to the same 
effect as the original message (or with minor 
changes). 
Installation and 
deployment(dep
loyment) 
Alpha  
Catch 
NullPointerExcepti
on 
It is generally a bad practice to catch 
NullPointerException. 
Implementation Alpha  
Comparing classes 
by name 
The practice of determining an object's type, based 
on its name, is dangerous since malicious code may 
purposely reuse class names in order to appear 
trusted. 
Implementation Alpha  
Comparing instead 
of assigning 
  Implementation Echo  
Comprehensive 
list of Threats to 
Authentication 
Procedures and 
Data 
  Implementation Bravo  
Covert timing 
channel 
Unintended information about data gets leaked 
through observing the timing of events. 
Installation and 
deployment(dep
loyment) 
Bravo  
CRLF Injection The term CRLF refers to Carriage Return (ASCII 
13, \r) Line Feed (ASCII 10, \n). They're used to 
note the termination of a line, however, dealt with 
differently in today’s popular Operating Systems. 
For example: in Windows both a CR and LF are 
required to note the end of a line, whereas in 
Linux/UNIX a LF is only required. 
Implementation Charlie  
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Cross Site 
Scripting Flaw 
Cross-Site Scripting attacks are a type of injection 
problem, in which malicious scripts are injected 
into the otherwise benign and trusted web sites. 
Cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks occur when an 
attacker uses a web application to send malicious 
code, generally in the form of a browser side script, 
to a different end user. Flaws that allow these 
attacks to succeed are quite widespread and occur 
anywhere a web application uses input from a user 
in the output it generates without validating or 
encoding it. 
Implementation Charlie  
Dangerous 
Function 
Functions that cannot be used safely should never 
be used.Certain functions behave in dangerous 
ways regardless of how they are used. Functions in 
this category were often implemented without 
taking security concerns into account. 
Testing and 
debugging 
(validation) 
Bravo  
Deletion of data-
structure sentinel 
The accidental deletion of a data structure sentinel 
can cause serious programing logic problems. 
Implementation Bravo  
Deserialization of 
untrusted data 
Data which is untrusted cannot be trusted to be well 
formed. 
Design Alpha  
Directory 
Restriction Error 
Improper use of the chroot() system call may allow 
attackers to escape a chroot jail.The application 
fails to enforce the intended restricted directory 
access policy. By using relative paths or other path 
traversal attack mechanisms, an attacker can access 
unauthorized files outside the restricted directory. 
Installation and 
deployment(dep
loyment) 
Echo  
Double Free Double free errors occur when free() is called more 
than once with the same memory address as an 
argument.Calling free() twice on the same value 
can lead to a buffer overflow. When a program 
calls free() twice with the same argument, the 
program's memory management data structures 
become corrupted. This corruption can cause the 
program to crash or, in some circumstances, cause 
two later calls to malloc() to return the same 
pointer. If malloc() returns the same value twice 
and the program later gives the attacker control 
over the data that is written into this doubly-
allocated memory, the program becomes vulnerable 
to a buffer overflow attack. 
Implementation Echo  
Doubly freeing 
memory 
Freeing or deleting the same memory chunk twice 
may - when combined with other flaws - result in a 
write-what-where condition. 
Implementation Echo  
Duplicate key in 
associative list 
Associative lists should always have unique keys, 
since having non-unique keys can often be 
Implementation Echo  
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(alist) mistaken for an error. 
Empty Catch 
Block 
Ignoring an exception can cause the program to 
overlook unexpected states and conditions.When an 
exception is thrown and not caught, the process has 
given up an opportunity to decide if a given failure 
or event is worth a change in execution.Just about 
every serious attack on a software system begins 
with the violation of a programmer's assumptions. 
After the attack, the programmer's assumptions 
seem flimsy and poorly founded, but before an 
attack many programmers would defend their 
assumptions well past the end of their lunch 
break.Two dubious assumptions that are easy to 
spot in code are "this method call can never fail" 
and "it doesn't matter if this call fails". When a 
programmer ignores an exception, they implicitly 
state that they are operating under one of these 
assumptions. 
Implementation Alpha  
Empty String 
Password 
Using an empty string as a password is insecure.It 
is never appropriate to use an empty string as a 
password. It is too easy to guess. Empty string 
password makes the authentication as weak as the 
user names, which are normally public or 
guessable. This make a brute-force attack against 
the login interface much easier. 
Design Bravo  
Failure of true 
random number 
generator 
True random number generators generally have a 
limited source of entropy and therefore can fail or 
block. 
Implementation Echo  
Failure to account 
for default case in 
switch 
The failure to account for the default case in switch 
statements may lead to complex logical errors and 
may aid in other, unexpected security-related 
conditions. 
Implementation Alpha  
Failure to add 
integrity check 
value 
If integrity check values or "checksums" are 
omitted from a protocol, there is no way of 
determining if data has been corrupted in 
transmission. 
Implementation Echo  
Failure to check 
for certificate 
revocation 
If a certificate is used without first checking to 
ensure it was not revoked, the certificate may be 
compromised. 
Implementation Alpha  
Failure to check 
integrity check 
value 
If integrity check values or "checksums" are not 
validated before messages are parsed and used, 
there is no way of determining if data has been 
corrupted in transmission. 
Implementation Echo  
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Failure to check 
whether privileges 
were dropped 
successfully 
If one changes security privileges, one should 
ensure that the change was successful. 
Implementation Alpha  
Failure to 
deallocate data 
If memory is allocated and not freed the process 
could continue to consume more and more memory 
and eventually crash. 
Implementation Echo  
Failure to drop 
privileges when 
reasonable 
Failing to drop privileges when it is reasonable to 
do so results in a lengthened time during which 
exploitation may result in unnecessarily negative 
consequences. 
Design Echo  
Failure to encrypt 
data 
The failure to encrypt data passes up the guarantees 
of confidentiality, integrity, and accountability that 
properly implemented encryption conveys. 
Design Bravo  
Failure to follow 
chain of trust in 
certificate 
validation 
Failure to follow the chain of trust when validating 
a certificate results in the trust of a given resource 
which has no connection to trusted root-certificate 
entities. 
Design Alpha  
Failure to follow 
guideline/specifica
tion 
  Implementation Bravo  
Failure to protect 
stored data from 
modification 
Data should be protected from direct modification. Design Bravo  
Failure to provide 
confidentiality for 
stored data 
Non-final public fields should be avoided, if 
possible, as the code is easily tamperable. 
Design Bravo  
Failure to validate 
certificate 
expiration 
The failure to validate certificate operation may 
result in trust being assigned to certificates which 
have been abandoned due to age. 
Implementation Bravo  
Failure to validate 
host-specific 
certificate data 
The failure to validate host-specific certificate data 
may mean that, while the certificate read was valid, 
it was not for the site originally requested. 
Implementation Echo  
File Access Race 
Condition: 
TOCTOU 
The window of time between when a file property 
is checked and when the file is used can be 
exploited to launch a privilege escalation attack. 
Implementation Alpha  
62 
 
Format String Allowing an attacker to control a function's format 
string may result in a buffer overflow.Format string 
vulnerabilities occur when:Data enters the 
application from an untrusted source.The data is 
passed as the format string argument to a function 
like sprintf(), FormatMessageW(), or 
syslog().Format string problems occur when a user 
has the ability to control or write completely the 
format string used to format data in the printf style 
family of C/C++ functions. 
Implementation Alpha  
Guessed or visible 
temporary file 
On some operating systems, the fact that the temp 
file exists may be apparent to any user. 
Implementation Bravo  
Hard-Coded 
Password 
A hard-coded password vulnerability occurs when 
usernames and passwords are included in HTML 
comments. Because HTML comments are not 
displayed, it was often the mentality that normal 
users would not see them. It can also occur when a 
specific username (usually unique) does not require 
a password. 
Design Charlie  
Heap Inspection Do not use realloc() to resize buffers that store 
sensitive information.Heap inspection 
vulnerabilities occur when sensitive data, such as a 
password or an encryption key, can be exposed to 
an attacker because they are not removed from 
memory.The realloc() function is commonly used 
to increase the size of a block of allocated memory. 
This operation often requires copying the contents 
of the old memory block into a new and larger 
block. This operation leaves the contents of the 
original block intact but inaccessible to the 
program, preventing the program from being able 
to scrub sensitive data from memory. If an attacker 
can later examine the contents of a memory dump, 
the sensitive data could be exposed. 
Implementation Bravo  
Heap overflow A heap overflow condition is a buffer overflow, 
where the buffer that can be overwritten is allocated 
in the heap portion of memory, generally meaning 
that the buffer was allocated using a routine such as 
the POSIX malloc() call. 
Implementation Alpha  
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Ignored function 
return value 
If a functions return value is not checked, it could 
have failed without any warning.Ignoring a 
method's return value can cause the program to 
overlook unexpected states and conditions. 
Just about every serious attack on a software 
system begins with the violation of a programmer's 
assumptions. After the attack, the programmer's 
assumptions seem flimsy and poorly founded, but 
before an attack many programmers would defend 
their assumptions well past the end of their lunch 
break.Two dubious assumptions that are easy to 
spot in code are "this function call can never fail" 
and "it doesn't matter if this function call fails". 
When a programmer ignores the return value from 
a function, they implicitly state that they are 
operating under one of these assumptions. 
Implementation Alpha  
Illegal Pointer 
Value 
This function can return a pointer to memory 
outside of the buffer to be searched. Subsequent 
operations on the pointer may have unintended 
consequences.This function can return a pointer to 
memory outside the bounds of the buffer to be 
searched under either of the following 
circumstances:An attacker can control the contents 
of the buffer to be searched,An attacker can control 
the value for which to search 
Implementation Alpha  
Improper cleanup 
on thrown 
exception 
Causing a change in flow, due to an exception, can 
often leave the code in a bad state. 
Implementation Alpha  
Improper Data 
Validation 
  Implementation Alpha  
Improper error 
handling 
Sometimes an error is detected, and bad or no 
action is taken. 
Implementation Echo  
Improper string 
length checking 
Improper string length checking takes place when 
wide or multi-byte character strings are mistaken 
for standard character strings. 
Implementation Echo  
Improper temp file 
opening 
Tempfile creation should be done in a safe way. To 
be safe, the temp file function should open up the 
temp file with appropriate access control. The temp 
file function should also retain this quality, while 
being resistant to race conditions. 
Implementation Alpha  
Incorrect block 
delimitation 
In some languages, forgetting to explicitly delimit a 
block can result in a logic error that can, in turn, 
have security implications. 
Implementation Alpha  
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Information 
Leakage 
Revealing system data or debugging information 
helps an adversary learn about the system and form 
a plan of attack. An information leak occurs when 
system data or debugging information leaves the 
program through an output stream or logging 
function. 
Requirements 
specification 
(AKA 
Verification)  
Alpha  
Information leak 
through class 
cloning 
Cloneable classes are effectively open classes since 
data cannot be hidden in them. 
Implementation Alpha  
Information leak 
through 
serialization 
Serializable classes are effectively open classes 
since data cannot be hidden in them. 
Implementation Alpha  
Injection problem Injection problems span a wide range of 
instantiations. The basic form of this flaw involves 
the injection of control-plane data into the data-
plane in order to alter the control flow of the 
process. 
Implementation Bravo  
Insecure Compiler 
Optimization 
Improperly scrubbing sensitive data from memory 
can compromise security. 
Compiler optimization errors occur when: 
Secret data is stored in memory. 
The secret data is scrubbed from memory by 
overwriting its contents. 
The source code is compiled using an optimizing 
compiler, which identifies and removes the 
function that overwrites the contents as a dead store 
because the memory is not used subsequently. 
Maintenance Alpha  
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Insecure 
Randomness 
Standard pseudo-random number generators cannot 
withstand cryptographic attacks. 
Insecure randomness errors occur when a function 
that can produce predictable values is used as a 
source of randomness in security-sensitive context. 
Computers are deterministic machines, and as such 
are unable to produce true randomness. Pseudo-
Random Number Generators (PRNGs) approximate 
randomness algorithmically, starting with a seed 
from which subsequent values are calculated. 
There are two types of PRNGs: statistical and 
cryptographic. Statistical PRNGs provide useful 
statistical properties, but their output is highly 
predictable and forms an easy to reproduce numeric 
stream that is unsuitable for use in cases where 
security depends on generated values being 
unpredictable. Cryptographic PRNGs address this 
problem by generating output that is more difficult 
to predict. For a value to be cryptographically 
secure, it must be impossible or highly improbable 
for an attacker to distinguish between it and a truly 
random value. In general, if a PRNG algorithm is 
not advertised as being cryptographically secure, 
then it is probably a statistical PRNG and should 
not be used in security-sensitive contexts. 
Implementation Bravo  
Insecure 
Temporary File 
Creating and using insecure temporary files can 
leave application and system data vulnerable to 
attacks. 
Applications require temporary files so frequently 
that many different mechanisms exist for creating 
them in the C Library and Windows® API. Most of 
these functions are vulnerable to various forms of 
attacks. 
Implementation Alpha  
Insecure Third 
Party Domain 
Access 
Occurs when an application contains content 
provided from a 3rd party resource that is delivered 
without any type of content scrub. 
Environments Affected 
Web servers 
Application servers 
Client Machines 
Integration    
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Insecure Transport The application configuration should ensure that 
SSL is used for all access controlled pages. 
If an application uses SSL to guarantee confidential 
communication with client browsers, the 
application configuration should make it impossible 
to view any access controlled page without SSL. 
However, it is not an uncommon problem that the 
configuration of the application fails to enforce the 
use of SSL on pages that contain sensitive data. 
There are three common ways for SSL to be 
bypassed: 
A user manually enters the URL and types "HTTP" 
rather than "HTTPS". 
Attackers intentionally send a user to an insecure 
URL. 
A programmer erroneously creates a relative link to 
a page in the application, failing to switch from 
HTTP to HTTPS. (This is particularly easy to do 
when the link moves between public and secured 
areas on a web site.) 
Installation and 
deployment(dep
loyment) 
Bravo  
Insufficient 
Entropy 
When an undesirably low amount of entropy is 
available. Psuedo Random Number Generators are 
susceptible to suffering from insufficient entropy 
when they are initialized, because entropy data may 
not be available to them yet. 
Implementation Alpha  
Insufficient 
entropy in pseudo-
random number 
generator 
The lack of entropy available for, or used by, a 
PRNG can be a stability and security threat. 
Implementation Alpha  
Insufficient 
Session-ID Length 
Session identifiers should be at least 128 bits long 
to prevent brute-force session guessing attacks. 
Implementation Alpha  
Integer coercion 
error 
Integer coercion refers to a set of flaws pertaining 
to the type casting, extension, or truncation of 
primitive data types. 
Implementation Alpha  
Integer overflow An integer overflow condition exists when an 
integer, which has not been properly sanity 
checked, is used in the determination of an offset or 
size for memory allocation, copying, concatenation, 
or similarly. If the integer in question is 
incremented past the maximum possible value, it 
may wrap to become a very small, or negative 
number, therefore providing a very incorrect value. 
Implementation Alpha  
Invoking untrusted 
mobile code 
This process will download external source or 
binaries and execute it. 
Implementation Alpha  
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J2EE 
Misconfiguration: 
Unsafe Bean 
Declaration 
Entity beans that expose a remote interface become 
part of an application's attack surface. For 
performance reasons, an application should rarely 
use remote entity beans, so there is a good chance 
that a remote entity bean declaration is an error. 
Implementation Alpha  
Key exchange 
without entity 
authentication 
Performing a key exchange without verifying the 
identity of the entity being communicated with will 
preserve the integrity of the information sent 
between the two entities; this will not, however, 
guarantee the identity of end entity. 
Implementation Alpha  
Least Privilege 
Violation 
The elevated privilege level required to perform 
operations such as chroot() should be dropped 
immediately after the operation is performed.When 
a program calls a privileged function, such as 
chroot(), it must first acquire root privilege. As 
soon as the privileged operation has completed, the 
program should drop root privilege and return to 
the privilege level of the invoking user. 
Implementation Alpha  
Leftover Debug 
Code 
Debug code can create unintended entry points in a 
deployed web application. 
A common development practice is to add "back 
door" code specifically designed for debugging or 
testing purposes that is not intended to be shipped 
or deployed with the application. When this sort of 
debug code is accidentally left in the application, 
the application is open to unintended modes of 
interaction. These back door entry points create 
security risks because they are not considered 
during design or testing and fall outside of the 
expected operating conditions of the application. 
Implementation Alpha  
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Log Forging Writing unvalidated user input to log files can 
allow an attacker to forge log entries or inject 
malicious content into the logs. 
Log forging vulnerabilities occur when: 
Data enters an application from an untrusted 
source. 
The data is written to an application or system log 
file. 
Applications typically use log files to store a 
history of events or transactions for later review, 
statistics gathering, or debugging. Depending on 
the nature of the application, the task of reviewing 
log files may be performed manually on an as-
needed basis or automated with a tool that 
automatically culls logs for important events or 
trending information. 
Interpretation of the log files may be hindered or 
misdirected if an attacker can supply data to the 
application that is subsequently logged verbatim. In 
the most benign case, an attacker may be able to 
insert false entries into the log file by providing the 
application with input that includes appropriate 
characters. If the log file is processed 
automatically, the attacker can render the file 
unusable by corrupting the format of the file or 
injecting unexpected characters. A more subtle 
attack might involve skewing the log file statistics. 
Forged or otherwise, corrupted log files can be used 
to cover an attacker's tracks or even to implicate 
another party in the commission of a malicious act 
[1]. In the worst case, an attacker may inject code 
or other commands into the log file and take 
advantage of a vulnerability in the log processing 
utility . 
Implementation Echo  
Log injection Log injection problems are a subset of injection 
problem, in which invalid entries taken from user 
input are inserted in logs or audit trails, allowing an 
attacker to mislead administrators or cover traces of 
attack. Log injection can also sometimes be used to 
attack log monitoring systems indirectly by 
injecting data that monitoring systems will 
misinterpret. 
Implementation Alpha  
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Member Field 
Race Condition 
Servlet member fields may allow one user to see 
another user's data. 
Many Servlet developers do not understand that, 
unless a Servlet implements the 
SingleThreadModel interface, the Servlet is a 
singleton; there is only one instance of the Servlet, 
and that single instance is used and re-used to 
handle multiple requests that are processed 
simultaneously by different threads. 
A common result of this misunderstanding is that 
developers use Servlet member fields in such a way 
that one user may inadvertently see another user's 
data. In other words, storing user data in Servlet 
member fields introduces a data access race 
condition. 
Implementation Alpha  
Memory leak A memory leak is an unintentional form of memory 
consumption whereby the developer fails to free an 
allocated block of memory when no longer needed 
Implementation Echo  
Miscalculated null 
termination 
Miscalculated null termination occurs when the 
placement of a null character at the end of a buffer 
of characters (or string) is misplaced or omitted. 
Implementation Alpha  
Misinterpreted 
function return 
value 
If a function's return value is not properly checked, 
the function could have failed without proper 
acknowledgement. 
Implementation Alpha  
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Missing Error 
Handling 
A web application must define a default error page 
for 404 errors, 500 errors, and to catch java.lang. 
Throwable exceptions prevent attackers from 
mining information from the application container's 
built-in error response. 
When an attacker explores a web site looking for 
vulnerabilities, the amount of information that the 
site provides is crucial to the eventual success or 
failure of any attempted attacks. If the application 
shows the attacker a stack trace, it relinquishes 
information that makes the attacker's job 
significantly easier. For example, a stack trace 
might show the attacker a malformed SQL query 
string, the type of database being used, and the 
version of the application container. This 
information enables the attacker to target known 
vulnerabilities in these components. 
The application configuration should specify a 
default error page in order to guarantee that the 
application will never leak error messages to an 
attacker. Handling standard HTTP error codes is 
useful and user-friendly in addition to being a good 
security practice, and a good configuration will also 
define a last-chance error handler that catches any 
exception that could possibly be thrown by the 
application. 
Implementation Alpha  
Missing parameter If too few arguments are sent to a function, the 
function will still pop the expected number of 
arguments from the stack. Potentially, a variable 
number of arguments could be exhausted in a 
function as well. 
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Missing XML 
Validation 
Failure to enable validation when parsing XML 
gives an attacker the opportunity to supply 
malicious input. 
Most successful attacks begin with a violation of 
the programmer's assumptions. By accepting an 
XML document without validating it against a 
DTD or XML schema, the programmer leaves a 
door open for attackers to provide unexpected, 
unreasonable, or malicious input. It is not possible 
for an XML parser to validate all aspects of a 
document's content; a parser cannot understand the 
complete semantics of the data. However, a parser 
can do a complete and thorough job of checking the 
document's structure and therefore guarantee to the 
code that processes the document that the content is 
well-formed. 
Implementation Alpha  
Mutable object 
returned 
Sending non-cloned mutable data as a return value 
may result in that data being altered or deleted by 
the called function, thereby putting the class in an 
undefined state. 
Implementation Alpha  
Non-cryptographic 
pseudo-random 
number generator 
The use of Non-cryptographic Pseudo-Random 
Number Generators (PRNGs) as a source for 
security can be very dangerous, since they are 
predictable. 
Implementation Bravo  
Not allowing 
password aging 
If no mechanism is in place for managing password 
aging, users will have no incentive to update 
passwords in a timely manner. 
Implementation Alpha  
Not using a 
random 
initialization 
vector with cipher 
block chaining 
mode 
Not using a random initialization vector with 
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode causes 
algorithms to be susceptible to dictionary attacks. 
Implementation Alpha  
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Null Dereference The program can potentially dereference a null 
pointer, thereby raising a NullPointerException. 
Null pointer errors are usually the result of one or 
more programmer assumptions being violated. 
Most null pointer issues result in general software 
reliability problems, but if an attacker can 
intentionally trigger a null pointer dereference, the 
attacker might be able to use the resulting exception 
to bypass security logic or to cause the application 
to reveal debugging information that will be 
valuable in planning subsequent attacks. 
A null-pointer dereference takes place when a 
pointer with a value of NULL is used as though it 
pointed to a valid memory area. 
Implementation Alpha  
Object Model 
Violation: Just 
One of equals() 
and hashCode() 
Defined 
This class overrides only one of equals() and 
hashCode(). 
Java objects are expected to obey a number of 
invariants related to equality. One of these 
invariants is that equal objects must have equal 
hashcodes. In other words, if a.equals(b) == true 
then a.hashCode() == b.hashCode(). 
Failure to uphold this invariant is likely to cause 
trouble if objects of this class are stored in a 
collection. If the objects of the class in question are 
used as a key in a Hashtable or if they are inserted 
into a Map or Set, it is critical that equal objects 
have equal hashcodes. 
Implementation Alpha  
Often Misused: 
Authentication 
Attackers can spoof DNS entries. Do not rely on 
DNS names for security. 
Many DNS servers are susceptible to spoofing 
attacks, so you should assume that your software 
will someday run in an environment with a 
compromised DNS server. If attackers are allowed 
to make DNS updates (sometimes called DNS 
cache poisoning), they can route your network 
traffic through their machines or make it appear as 
if their IP addresses are part of your domain. Do 
not base the security of your system on DNS 
names. 
Implementation Bravo  
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Often Misused: 
Exception 
Handling 
The _alloca() function can throw a stack overflow 
exception, potentially causing the program to crash. 
The _alloca() function allocates memory on the 
stack. If an allocation request is too large for the 
available stack space, _alloca() throws an 
exception. If the exception is not caught, the 
program will crash, potentially enabling a denial of 
service attack. 
_alloca() has been deprecated as of Microsoft 
Visual Studio 2005®. It has been replaced with the 
more secure _alloca_s(). 
Implementation Alpha  
Often Misused: 
File System 
Passing an inadequately-sized output buffer to a 
path manipulation function can result in a buffer 
overflow. 
Windows provides a large number of utility 
functions that manipulate buffers containing 
filenames. In most cases, the result is returned in a 
buffer that is passed in as input. (Usually the 
filename is modified in place.) Most functions 
require the buffer to be at least MAX_PATH bytes 
in length, but you should check the documentation 
for each function individually. If the buffer is not 
large enough to store the result of the manipulation, 
a buffer overflow can occur. 
Implementation Bravo  
Often Misused: 
Privilege 
Management 
Failure to adhere to the principle of least privilege 
amplifies the risk posed by other vulnerabilities. 
Programs that run with root privileges have caused 
innumerable Unix security disasters. It is 
imperative that you carefully review privileged 
programs for all kinds of security problems, but it is 
equally important that privileged programs drop 
back to an unprivileged state as quickly as possible 
in order to limit the amount of damage that an 
overlooked vulnerability might be able to cause. 
Privilege management functions can behave in 
some less-than-obvious ways, and they have 
different quirks on different platforms. These 
inconsistencies are particularly pronounced if you 
are transitioning from one non-root user to another.
Signal handlers and spawned processes run at the 
privilege of the owning process, so if a process is 
running as root when a signal fires or a sub-process 
is executed, the signal handler or sub-process will 
operate with root privileges. An attacker may be 
able to leverage these elevated privileges to do 
further damage. 
Implementation Alpha  
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Often Misused: 
String 
Management 
Functions that convert between Multibyte and 
Unicode strings encourage buffer overflows. 
Windows provides the MultiByteToWideChar(), 
WideCharToMultiByte(), UnicodeToBytes, and 
BytesToUnicode functions to convert between 
arbitrary multibyte (usually ANSI) character strings 
and Unicode (wide character) strings. The size 
arguments to these functions are specified in 
different units – one in bytes, the other in characters 
– making their use prone to error. In a multibyte 
character string, each character occupies a varying 
number of bytes, and therefore the size of such 
strings is most easily specified as a total number of 
bytes. In Unicode, however, characters are always a 
fixed size, and string lengths are typically given by 
the number of characters they contain. Mistakenly 
specifying the wrong units in a size argument can 
lead to a buffer overflow. 
Implementation Alpha  
Omitted break 
statement 
Omitting a break statement so that one may fall 
through is often indistinguishable from an error, 
and therefore should not be used. 
Implementation Alpha  
Open forward An open forward is an application that takes a 
parameter and forwards a user to another part of the 
application without any validation or access control 
checks. This may allow an attacker to bypass 
access control checks, especially those enforced 
externally, such as by a web server. 
Implementation Alpha  
Open redirect An open redirect is an application that takes a 
parameter and redirects a user to the parameter 
value without any validation. This vulnerability is 
used in phishing attacks to get users to visit 
malicious sites without realizing it. 
Implementation Alpha  
Overflow of static 
internal buffer 
A non-final static field can be viewed and edited in 
dangerous ways. 
Implementation Echo  
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Overly-Broad 
Catch Block 
The catch block handles a broad swath of 
exceptions, potentially trapping dissimilar issues or 
problems that should not be dealt with at this point 
in the program. 
Multiple catch blocks can get ugly and repetitive, 
but "condensing" catch blocks by catching a high-
level class like Exception can obscure exceptions 
that deserve special treatment or that should not be 
caught at this point in the program. Catching an 
overly broad exception essentially defeats the 
purpose of Java's typed exceptions, and can become 
particularly dangerous if the program grows and 
begins to throw new types of exceptions. The new 
exception types will not receive any attention. 
Implementation Alpha  
Overly-Broad 
Throws 
Declaration 
The method throws a generic exception making it 
harder for callers to do a good job of error handling 
and recovery. 
Declaring a method to throw Exception or 
Throwable makes it difficult for callers to do good 
error handling and error recovery. Java's exception 
mechanism is set up to make it easy for callers to 
anticipate what can go wrong and write code to 
handle each specific exceptional circumstance. 
Declaring that a method throws a generic form of 
exception defeats this system. 
Implementation Alpha  
Passing mutable 
objects to an 
untrusted method 
Sending non-cloned mutable data as an argument 
may result in that data being altered or deleted by 
the called function, thereby putting the calling 
function into an undefined state. 
Implementation Echo  
Password 
Management: 
Hardcoded 
Password 
Hardcoded passwords may compromise system 
security in a way that cannot be easily remedied. 
It is never a good idea to hardcode a password. Not 
only does hardcoding a password allow all of the 
project's developers to view the password, it also 
makes fixing the problem extremely difficult. Once 
the code is in production, the password cannot be 
changed without patching the software. If the 
account protected by the password is compromised, 
the owners of the system will be forced to choose 
between security and availability. 
Implementation Bravo  
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Password 
Management: 
Weak 
Cryptography 
Obscuring a password with a trivial encoding does 
not protect the password. 
Password management issues occur when a 
password is stored in plaintext in an application's 
properties or configuration file. A programmer can 
attempt to remedy the password management 
problem by obscuring the password with an 
encoding function, such as base 64 encoding, but 
this effort does not adequately protect the 
password. 
Implementation Bravo  
Password Plaintext 
Storage 
Storing a password in plaintext may result in a 
system compromise. 
Password management issues occur when a 
password is stored in plaintext in an application's 
properties or configuration file. A programmer can 
attempt to remedy the password management 
problem by obscuring the password with an 
encoding function, such as base 64 encoding, but 
this effort does not adequately protect the 
password. 
Storing a plaintext password in a configuration file 
allows anyone who can read the file access to the 
password-protected resource. Developers 
sometimes believe that they cannot defend the 
application from someone who has access to the 
configuration, but this attitude makes an attacker's 
job easier. Good password management guidelines 
require that a password never be stored in plaintext. 
Implementation Bravo  
PHP File Inclusion PHP, as many other languages, allows the inclusion 
of files in order to provide or extend the 
functionality of the current file. 
Implementation Bravo  
Poor Logging 
Practice 
  Implementation Echo  
Portability Flaw Functions with inconsistent implementations across 
operating systems and operating system versions 
cause portability problems. 
The behavior of functions in this category varies by 
operating system, and at times, even by operating 
system version. Implementation differences can 
include: 
Slight differences in the way parameters are 
interpreted, leading to inconsistent results. 
Some implementations of the function carry 
significant security risks. 
The function might not be defined on all platforms. 
Implementation Alpha  
77 
 
Privacy Violation Mishandling private information, such as customer 
passwords or social security numbers, can 
compromise user privacy, and is often illegal. 
Implementation Bravo  
PRNG Seed Error The incorrect use of a seed by a Psuedo Random 
Number Generator. A seed error is usually brought 
on through the erroneous generation or application 
of a seed state. 
Implementation Alpha  
Process Control Executing commands from an untrusted source or 
in an untrusted environment can cause an 
application to execute malicious commands on 
behalf of an attacker. 
Process control vulnerabilities take two forms: 
An attacker can change the command that the 
program executes: the attacker explicitly controls 
what the command is. 
An attacker can change the environment in which 
the command executes: the attacker implicitly 
controls what the command means. 
We will first consider the first scenario, the 
possibility that an attacker may be able to control 
the command that is executed. Process control 
vulnerabilities of this type occur when: 
Data enters the application from an untrusted 
source. 
The data is used as or as part of a string 
representing a command that is executed by the 
application. 
By executing the command, the application gives 
an attacker a privilege or capability that the attacker 
would not otherwise have. 
Implementation Bravo  
Publicizing of 
private data when 
using inner classes 
Java byte code has no notion of an inner class; 
therefore inner classes provide only a package-level 
security mechanism. Furthermore, the inner class 
gets access to the fields of its outer class even if 
that class is declared private. 
Implementation Alpha  
Race Conditions A race condition occurs when a pair of routine 
programming calls in an application do not perform 
in the sequential manner that was intended per 
business rules. It is a timing event within software 
that can become a security vulnerability if the calls 
are not performed in the correct order. 
Implementation Alpha  
Reflection attack 
in an auth protocol 
Simple authentication protocols are subject to 
reflection attacks if a malicious user can use the 
target machine to impersonate a trusted user. 
Implementation Alpha  
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Reflection 
injection 
Reflection injection problems are a subset of 
injection problems, in which external input is used 
to construct a string value passed to class reflection 
APIs. By manipulating the value an attacker can 
cause unexpected classes to be loaded, or change 
what method or fields are accessed on an object. 
Implementation Alpha  
Relative path 
library search 
Certain functions perform automatic path 
searching. The method and results of this path 
searching may not be as expected. Example: 
WinExec will use the space character as a 
delimiter, finding "C:\Program.exe" as an 
acceptable result for a search for "C:\Program 
Files\Foo\Bar.exe". 
Implementation Alpha  
Reliance on data 
layout 
Assumptions about protocol data or data stored in 
memory can be invalid, resulting in using data in 
ways that were unintended. 
Implementation Echo  
Relying on 
package-level 
scope 
Java packages are not inherently closed; therefore, 
relying on them for code security is not a good 
practice. 
Implementation Alpha  
Resource 
exhaustion 
Resource exhaustion is a simple denial of service 
condition which occurs when the resources 
necessary to perform an action are entirely 
consumed, therefore preventing that action from 
taking place. 
Implementation Alpha  
Return Inside 
Finally Block 
Returning from inside a finally block will cause 
exceptions to be lost. 
A return statement inside a finally block will cause 
any exception that might be thrown in the try block 
to be discarded. 
Implementation Alpha  
Reusing a nonce, 
key pair in 
encryption 
Nonces should be used for the present occasion and 
only once. 
Implementation Alpha  
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Session_Fixation Authenticating a user without invalidating any 
existing session identifier gives an attacker the 
opportunity to steal authenticated sessions. 
Session fixation vulnerabilities occur when: 
A web application authenticates a user without first 
invalidating the existing session ID, thereby 
continuing to use the session ID already associated 
with the user. 
An attacker is able to force a known session ID on 
a user so that, once the user authenticates, the 
attacker has access to the authenticated session. 
In the generic exploit of session fixation 
vulnerabilities, an attacker creates a new session on 
a web application and records the associated 
session identifier. The attacker then causes the 
victim to authenticate against the server using the 
same session identifier, giving the attacker access 
to the user's account through the active session. 
Implementation Alpha  
Sign extension 
error 
If one extends a signed number incorrectly, if 
negative numbers are used, an incorrect extension 
may result. 
Implementation Alpha  
Signed to unsigned 
conversion error 
A signed-to-unsigned conversion error takes place 
when a signed primitive is used as an unsigned 
value, usually as a size variable. 
Implementation Alpha  
Stack overflow A stack overflow condition is a buffer overflow 
condition, where the buffer being overwritten is 
allocated on the stack (i.e., is a local variable or, 
rarely, a parameter to a function). 
Implementation Alpha  
State 
synchronization 
error 
State synchronization refers to a set of flaws 
involving contradictory states of execution in a 
process which result in undefined behavior. 
Implementation Alpha  
Storing passwords 
in a recoverable 
format 
The storage of passwords in a recoverable format 
makes them subject to password reuse attacks by 
malicious users. If a system administrator can 
recover the password directly, or use a brute force 
search on the information available to him, he can 
use the password on other accounts. 
Implementation Bravo  
String Termination 
Error 
Relying on proper string termination may result in a 
buffer overflow. 
String termination errors occur when: 
Data enters a program via a function that does not 
null terminate its output. 
The data is passed to a function that requires its 
input to be null terminated. 
Implementation Alpha  
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Symbolic name 
not mapping to 
correct object 
A constant symbolic reference to an object is used, 
even though the underlying object changes over 
time. 
Implementation Alpha  
Truncation error Truncation errors occur when a primitive is cast to 
a primitive of a smaller size and data is lost in the 
conversion. 
Implementation Alpha  
Trust Boundary 
Violation 
Commingling trusted and untrusted data in the 
same data structure encourages programmers to 
mistakenly trust unvalidated data. 
A trust boundary can be thought of as line drawn 
through a program. On one side of the line, data is 
untrusted. On the other side of the line, data is 
assumed to be trustworthy. The purpose of 
validation logic is to allow data to safely cross the 
trust boundary--to move from untrusted to trusted. 
A trust boundary violation occurs when a program 
blurs the line between what is trusted and what is 
untrusted. The most common way to make this 
mistake is to allow trusted and untrusted data to 
commingle in the same data structure. 
Implementation Alpha  
Trust of system 
event data 
Security based on event locations are insecure and 
can be spoofed. 
Implementation Alpha  
Trusting self-
reported DNS 
name 
The use of self-reported DNS names as 
authentication is flawed and can easily be spoofed 
by malicious users. 
Implementation Alpha  
Trusting self-
reported IP address 
The use of IP addresses as authentication is flawed 
and can easily be spoofed by malicious users. 
Implementation Alpha  
Uncaught 
exception 
Ignoring an exception can cause the program to 
overlook unexpected states and conditions. 
When an exception is thrown and not caught, the 
process has given up an opportunity to decide if a 
given failure or event is worth a change in 
execution. 
Just about every serious attack on a software 
system begins with the violation of a programmer's 
assumptions. After the attack, the programmer's 
assumptions seem flimsy and poorly founded, but 
before an attack many programmers would defend 
their assumptions well past the end of their lunch 
break. 
Two dubious assumptions that are easy to spot in 
code are "this method call can never fail" and "it 
doesn't matter if this call fails". When a 
programmer ignores an exception, they implicitly 
state that they are operating under one of these 
Implementation Alpha  
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assumptions. 
Unchecked array 
indexing 
Unchecked array indexing occurs when an 
unchecked value is used as an index into a buffer. 
Implementation Echo  
Unchecked Return 
Value: Missing 
Check against Null 
Ignoring a method's return value can cause the 
program to overlook unexpected states and 
conditions. 
Just about every serious attack on a software 
system begins with the violation of a programmer's 
assumptions. After the attack, the programmer's 
assumptions seem flimsy and poorly founded, but 
before an attack many programmers would defend 
their assumptions well past the end of their lunch 
break. 
Two dubious assumptions that are easy to spot in 
code are "this function call can never fail" and "it 
doesn't matter if this function call fails". When a 
programmer ignores the return value from a 
function, they implicitly state that they are 
operating under one of these assumptions. 
Implementation Alpha  
Undefined 
Behavior 
The behavior of this function is undefined unless its 
control parameter is set to a specific value. 
The Linux Standard Base Specification 2.0.1 for 
libc places constraints on the arguments to some 
internal functions [1]. If the constraints are not met, 
the behavior of the functions is not defined. 
Implementation Alpha  
Uninitialized 
Variable 
Using the value of an unitialized variable is not 
safe. 
Implementation Bravo  
Unintentional 
pointer scaling 
In C and C++, one may accidentally refer to the 
wrong memory due to the semantics of when math 
operations are implicitly scaled. 
Implementation Alpha  
Unreleased 
Resource 
The program can potentially fail to release a system 
resource. 
Most unreleased resource issues result in general 
software reliability problems, but if an attacker can 
intentionally trigger a resource leak, the attacker 
might be able to launch a denial of service attack by 
depleting the resource pool. 
Resource leaks have at least two common causes: 
Error conditions and other exceptional 
circumstances. 
Confusion over which part of the program is 
responsible for releasing the resource. 
Implementation Echo  
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Unrestricted File 
Upload 
Uploaded files represent a significant risk to 
applications. The first step in many attacks is to get 
some code to the system to be attacked. Then the 
attack only needs to find a way to get the code 
executed. Using a file upload helps the attacker 
accomplish the first step. 
The consequences of unrestricted file upload can 
vary, including complete system takeover, an 
overloaded file system, forwarding attacks to 
backend systems, and simple defacement. It 
depends on what the application does with the 
uploaded file, including where it is stored. 
There are really two different classes of problems 
here. The first is with the file metadata, like the 
path and filename. These are generally provided by 
the transport, such as HTTP multipart encoding. 
This data may trick the application into overwriting 
a critical file or storing the file in a bad location. 
You must validate the metadata extremely carefully 
before using it. 
The other class of problem is with the file content. 
The range of problems here depends entirely on 
what the file is used for. See the examples below 
for some ideas about how files might be misused. 
To protect against this type of attack, you should 
analyze everything your application does with files 
and think carefully about what processing and 
interpreters are involved. 
Implementation Bravo  
Unsafe function 
call from a signal 
handler 
There are several functions which - under certain 
circumstances, if used in a signal handler - may 
result in the corruption of memory, allowing for 
exploitation of the process. 
Implementation Bravo  
Unsafe JNI Improper use of the Java Native Interface (JNI) can 
render Java applications vulnerable to security 
flaws in other languages. 
Unsafe JNI errors occur when a Java application 
uses JNI to call code written in another 
programming language. 
Implementation   
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Unsafe Mobile 
Code 
Mobile code, such as a Java Applet, is code that is 
transmitted across a network and executed on a 
remote machine. Because mobile code developers 
have little if any control of the environment in 
which their code will execute, special security 
concerns become relevant. One of the biggest 
environmental threats results from the risk that the 
mobile code will run side-by-side with other, 
potentially malicious, mobile code. Because all of 
the popular web browsers execute code from 
multiple sources together in the same JVM, many 
of the security guidelines for mobile code are 
focused on preventing manipulation of your objects' 
state and behavior by adversaries who have access 
to the same virtual machine where your program is 
running. 
Implementation Alpha  
Unsafe Reflection An attacker may be able to create unexpected 
control flow paths through the application, 
potentially bypassing security checks. 
If an attacker can supply values that the application 
then uses to determine which class to instantiate or 
which method to invoke, the potential exists for the 
attacker to create control flow paths through the 
application that were not intended by the 
application developers. This attack vector may 
allow the attacker to bypass authentication or 
access control checks or otherwise cause the 
application to behave in an unexpected manner. 
This situation becomes a doomsday scenario if the 
attacker can upload files into a location that appears 
on the application's classpath or add new entries to 
the application's classpath. Under either of these 
conditions, the attacker can use reflection to 
introduce new, presumably malicious, behavior into 
the application. 
Implementation Bravo  
Unsigned to signed 
conversion error 
An unsigned-to-signed conversion error takes place 
when a large unsigned primitive is used as an 
signed value - usually as a size variable. 
Implementation   
Use of hard-coded 
password 
The use of a hard-coded password increases the 
possibility of password guessing tremendously. 
Implementation Alpha  
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Use of Obsolete 
Methods 
The use of deprecated or obsolete functions may 
indicate neglected code. 
As programming languages evolve, functions 
occasionally become obsolete due to: 
Advances in the language 
Improved understanding of how operations should 
be performed effectively and securely 
Changes in the conventions that govern certain 
operations 
Functions that are removed are usually replaced by 
newer counterparts that perform the same task in 
some different and hopefully improved way. 
Refer to the documentation for this function in 
order to determine why it is deprecated or obsolete 
and to learn about alternative ways to achieve the 
same functionality. The remainder of this text 
discusses general problems that stem from the use 
of deprecated or obsolete functions. 
Implementation Echo  
Use of sizeof() on 
a pointer type 
Running sizeof() on a malloced pointer type will 
always return the wordsize/8. 
Implementation Echo  
Using a broken or 
risky 
cryptographic 
algorithm 
Attempting to create non-standard and non-tested 
algorithms, using weak algorithms, or applying 
algorithms incorrectly will pose a high weakness to 
data that is meant to be secure. 
Implementation Alpha  
Using a key past 
its expiration date 
The use of a cryptographic key or password past its 
expiration date diminishes its safety significantly. 
Implementation Alpha  
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Using freed 
memory 
Referencing memory after it has been freed can 
cause a program to crash. 
The use of heap allocated memory after it has been 
freed or deleted leads to undefined system behavior 
and, in many cases, to a write-what-where 
condition. 
Use after free errors occur when a program 
continues to use a pointer after it has been freed. 
Like double free errors and memory leaks, use after 
free errors have two common and sometimes 
overlapping causes: 
Error conditions and other exceptional 
circumstances 
Confusion over which part of the program is 
responsible for freeing the memory 
Use after free errors sometimes have no effect and 
other times cause a program to crash. While it is 
technically feasible for the freed memory to be re-
allocated and for an attacker to use this reallocation 
to launch a buffer overflow attack, we are unaware 
of any exploits based on this type of attack. 
Implementation Alpha  
Using password 
systems 
The use of password systems as the primary means 
of authentication may be subject to several flaws or 
shortcomings, each reducing the effectiveness of 
the mechanism. 
Implementation Delta  
Using referer field 
for authentication 
or authorization 
The referrer field (actually spelled 'referer') in 
HTTP requests can be easily modified and, as such, 
is not a valid means of message integrity checking. 
Implementation Bravo  
Using single-factor 
authentication 
The use of single-factor authentication can lead to 
unnecessary risk of compromise when compared 
with the benefits of a dual-factor authentication 
scheme. 
Implementation Echo  
Using the wrong 
operator 
This is a common error given when an operator is 
used which does not make sense in context. 
Implementation Bravo  
Validation 
performed in client 
Performing validation in client side code, generally 
JavaScript, provides no protection for server-side 
code. An attacker can simply disable JavaScript, 
use telnet, or use a security testing proxy such as 
WebScarab to bypass the client side validation. 
Implementation Alpha  
Wrap-around error Wrap around errors occur whenever a value is 
incriminated past the maximum value for its type 
and therefore "wraps around" to a very small, 
negative, or undefined value. 
Implementation Echo  
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Write-what-where 
condition 
Any condition where the attacker has the ability to 
write an arbitrary value to an arbitrary location, 
often as the result of a buffer overflow. 
Implementation Alpha  
Table 3.1: Collected Vulnerabilities 
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